kinship terminological typologies and a better empirical and theoretical understanding of the factors -historical, social, cognitive -that shape terminologies and that should be reflected in useful typologies.
An important sociolinguistic question -which can feed back on the shaping of the terminology -concerns the functioning of kinship. Communicative goals to which speakers address kinship terms (or which hearers infer from the use of kinship terms) in conversation may not relate directly to the factors that led to the presence of those terms. For example, the Fanti terminology has generationally skewed and unskewed variants that, inter alia, provide alternative terms for cross cousins. The variants represent different emphases on formal lineage vs. socialization roles; decisions regarding usage can represent a classification of the conversational setting in terms of those emphases. Such decisions sometimes, though, are the product of a more purely local (and unrelated) conversational concern -as when each cousin picks the most senior of the available terms ('father' from 'sibling' vs. 'father' on the one side, and 'sibling' from 'sibling' vs. 'child' on the other) as a means of showing respect for the other. Thus, questions of conversational use and of meaning within discourse have to be separately addressed and analyzed before being related to our typologies and to the properties which shape them.
These questions concerning the relationship of kinship terminological systems to other facets of kinship, to historical, social and cognitive processes and to discourse usage are intrinsically important to anthropology. Their importance comes from the centrality of kinship to so many societies, the important role that language plays in our understanding of kinship -both as anthropologists and as native speakers -and the relatively greater availability of good terminological vs. other kinds of data. Linguistic kinship data are also important because of another aspect of everyday vocabulary: the fact that the terms are not constructed by fiat (on ideological or political or religious grounds), but instead are the result of a continuing winnowing process by which concepts that are important to people in their common conversations find their way into the language at the expense of less important ones. American English has added words such as 'radio', 'television', 'computer', and has lost words such as 'beck' (a kind of watercourse) or 'tinker' (as tinsmith). The primary senses in which words are understood track the communication needs of their users. The active kinship vocabulary of any given culture then has to be seen as the result of active communicative use and thus as having some ongoing communicative importance to its users -even if that importance may not be equivalent to the historical bases and even if people in other similar cultures might make do with different kinship terms.
As the preceding suggests, the fact that kinship terms are words in a language makes them instances of the wider theoretical issues that revolve around the relationship of language to culture and thought. Several factors make kinship terms an almost ideal place to study such issues. A few factors work in the other direction, limiting the wider usefulness of kinship studies. The major limitation is the linguistically unusual form of folk definitions of kin term categories -the relative product calculus of 'my uncle's child is my cousin' vs. the more direct feature definition of a 'table' as The American Heritage Dictionary's 'An article of furniture supported by one or more vertical legs and having a flat horizontal surface'. The positive features of the kinship laboratory include the ubiquity of kinship terms and their presence in non-esoteric everyday language. This provides us with an unusual opportunity to compare comparable units across a wide variety of cultures, and to query the differences that various cultural features make in the terminological system. Uniformly, kinship terminological systems include a limited and bounded set of terms (limited sufficiently to be manageable) -typically, well under 50. Enough variability occurs among systems to make comparisons interesting, but there is enough regularity to encourage analysis. One such regularity is the existence of a relatively small number of common types (already roughly noted by Morgan) into which most terminologies fall 1 -even if there remain always kinds of further variation that the types miss, even if there exist some few terminologies that seem not to fit the types and even if the improvement of our typologies remains one major theoretical need. The long history of typological studies in kinship and the amount of analytic closure already achieved here -vs. the seemingly unbounded nature of comparable classification problems in most other areas of anthropological interest -make kinship terminoloies particularly useful for the analytic exploration of what kinds of factors shape language and what kinds of constraints govern that shaping.
As we have seen, analysis of the factors that structure kinship terminologies depends on good bases for representing terminological regularities, for separating 'meaningful' regularities from more incidental ones and assessing which terminologies share important structuring features -on the basis of which societies possessing shared terminological features can be compared for other non-linguistic regularities.
For many years anthropologists have attempted such comparison using their intuitive senses of what terminological features were important and/or which terminological equations (or other relations) were systematically (or diagnostically) important. Such work has led to some significant findings (going back, for instance, to Murdock's Social Structure in 1949) but never to the clarity that scholars had hoped for. Since Murdock's work, and in part in reaction to its ad hoc aspects, the major thrust of work in kinship terminological studies has been to develop more explicit and more systematic forms of formal analysis. The intent is to enable scholars to see exactly what regularities are asserted in an analysis and to assess the minimal amount of information needed to reproduce the regularities of one or another system. Much of this work has explored different forms of analysis. These have included componential analysis, rewrite rule analysis, genealogically-based algebraic formulations, social category-based algebraic formulations, and formulations based on native speaker reasoning about kinship categories and relations. The focus for a long time was on finding logically powerful and empirically efficient analytic formats, and not so much on the wider social, historical and cognitive issues that drove earlier kin terminological studies. The formal issues, if not finally resolved, are now well enough understood to allow a return to the wider empirical issues with powerful new tools.
Lastly, kin terminological studies provide a laboratory for enlarging our understanding of formal analysis. In a long and richly studied area such as kinship, where we have detailed but systematically structured empirical data, we can evaluate the usefulnessand limitations -of alternative kinds of formal approaches. Extant analyses of kin terminological systems (e.g. Lehman's and Read's papers in this issue, and Gould, 2000) demonstrate that rigorous formal mathematical theory in anthropology is possible, productive and testable. I want to note that we are talking of genuine mathematical theories and not of mathematical representations (metaphors or analogies) of more loosely formulated theories or of the use of mathematical data description or analysis in the ANTHROPOLOGICAL THEORY 1(2) context of less formally expressed empirical theorizing or induction. Mathematically explicit theories are valuable for empirical work. They allow a wide range of theorems to be deduced and empirically evaluated; their theorems end up forcing us to notice and account for previously unsuspected kinds and ranges of empirical data. A number of general questions follow. How much of the rest of culture, including semantics, is susceptible to such analysis? Which parts are susceptible and which not? Does an axiomatic algebraic analysis of a terminological system capture and lay out all that we need to know in connection with an analysis of the social, historical and cognitive factors that shape that system, and with an analysis of the sociolinguistic conditions that shape the system's use in discourse? If not, can the omissions be captured by alternative formalisms? Are there important aspects of our analytic or comparative analyses that seem beyond the reach of any such formal treatments? These are questions of theoretical importance for anthropology, affecting the nature of description and analysis. Kinship studies are one area in which the state of the art is sufficient to allow them to be systematically addressed.
FORMAL ANALYSIS
This discussion will rely on a range of interconnected analytic concepts that seem worth laying out explicitly. I want to begin with the idea of a 'formal' account -that is, an account constructed of explicit entities and operations, where an 'account' is some characterization within the range from description to explanatory theory. A formal account seems a precondition for any further analytic development, whether only a productive, insightful definition of some set of theoretically interesting concepts or an explanatory theory of those concepts. A minimal explicit definition of a concept is simply an extensive definition -a list of instances or exemplars delineating what is discussed. A better definition of a concept (or set of concepts) is an intensive definitionvia a procedure or rule that enables one to recognize instances. In the case of a concept with an infinite set of exemplars, such a definition is the only form available for a complete definition of the concept. Insofar as an intensive definition can be found for a concept (or set of concepts) where the definition seems notably shorter or simpler than the (extensive) list, 2 we tend to infer that the successful definition relates systematically to whatever processes produced or shaped the concept or concepts in question.
A 'theory', in this context, is a set of assumptions or axioms, regarding entities and operations from which can be deduced the range of concepts and instances (exemplars, but in this context maybe better thought of as 'instantiations') in the empirical domain (universe of phenomena) with which one is concerned. A theory will entail formal definitions of relevant entities, operations and concepts. Such definitions may well not precisely match the initial descriptive ones that led to the theory; they are 'theory dependent'. 3 The relationship between insight and effective theory, then, involves successive approximations. 4 A theory is evaluated via its production of empirical theorems about the target domain. These theorems go beyond the initial definitions, and go even beyond the initial hunch that produced the theory -i.e. that suggested what relational properties of the domain might be addressed in the first instance in order to produce the most significant generalization. A theory is empirically 'useful' to the degree that it systematically and effectively addresses distinctions and relations that we find in our world of empirical experience and that seem important to us. It should reveal things about that world that KRONENFELD Introduction we had not anticipated, but that once revealed seem convincingly true and general. A useful theory should be powerful and insightful. It should, as a saying puts it, 'carve nature at the joints'.
A theory can be descriptive or explanatory. A descriptive theory can provide a complete description of the universe in question, but lack some of the additional attributes that we normally expect of an explanation. Typically, an explanation relies on more general principles than those pertinent to the given domain alone (see Greenberg, 1968: Ch. 10, pp. 177-96) . Wherever we have a good descriptive theory of a reasonably complex domain, we do tend to infer that that descriptive theory relates in some systematic way 5 to whatever will turn out to be a successful explanatory theory of that domain.
A partial explanation can exist that addresses one systematic set of constraints on the domain in question without addressing others. In our kinship universe such partial explanations might involve, for instance, either social or cognitive shapers, or they might address the nature of the actual cognitive operations used by native speakers. Sometimes we proffer guesses about such partial explanations -that is, guesses about operative general principles -without having actual theories or sometimes even formal definitions. Such guesses can be useful if they guide our search for definitions and theories. And sometimes, prior to having any clear or specific theoretical guess, we construct descriptive definitions that particularly closely relate to some domain of potential partial explanation. We hope such angles of vision will facilitate the development of theory.
GENERAL ISSUES
What do we mean by an 'explanation' of a kin term system? What particular kinds of empirical factors or aspects of more general knowledge strike us as important to a successful explanation? The debate between Kroeber (1909) and, first, Rivers (1910) and, then, Radcliffe-Brown (e.g. 1924 , 1941 explicitly posed the 'what factors' part of our question 6 -as a contest between 'social' and 'psychological' (i.e. broad linguistic) factors 7 (see Kronenfeld, 1975; Hage, 1997) . Although neither side ever explicitly addressed the issue of what was meant by an explanation, both, in practice, settled for a kind of rough similarity of a given kin terminological pattern to something else, where the something else was then considered the explanation. For Kroeber the similarity was between the set of features on which the terms within a given system contrasted with one another and the set of features on which terms contrasted in other systems (or systems in general). He dismissed both social factors and factors relating to the specifics of any particular cultural system. In Radcliffe-Brown's case the similarity was, within a given culture, between the membership of some noteworthy kin term category and the membership of some significant kinship grouping; linguistic and cognitive factors, especially those relating particularly to terminological issues, were downplayed. Neither side attempted any explicit formal evaluation of how well the proffered explanation actually worked, nor of where it fell short -nor, it follows, did either side offer any criterion by which such success might be explicitly evaluated. In spite of some attempts to introduce a more explicit accounting -that is, reduction of the terminology to some small set of axioms from which the full data could then be deduced (such as, for example, Greenberg's [1949] application of formal logic, Davis and Warner's formal analysis [1937] , Leach's [1945] attempt to model the terminological categories implicit in ANTHROPOLOGICAL THEORY 1(2) Jinghpa social groupings and residence patterns, and Tax's impressive [1955b] explicit systematic application of Radcliffe-Brownian principles to the analysis of the Fox terminology -however, note the contrast of that effort with his 1955a attempt at a more general statement) -the debate was not much advanced until the introduction of componential analysis by Lounsbury and by Goodenough in 1956. Lounsbury, first in his Pawnee paper (1956) , but then more formally and thoroughly in his Iroquois paper (1964a), made explicit the kind of accounting suggested by Kroeber in 1909. Subsequently, in his Crow and Omaha paper (1964b) , Lounsbury gave us a comparable formalization of the terminological effects of the issues posed by RadcliffeBrown -and, incidentally, strengthened the case made by Morgan for the importance of rules of inheritance.
Lounsbury's two types of analyses formalized the analytic insights embodied in the two sides of the Kroeber-Radcliffe-Brown debate. By introducing an explicit and detailed formal accounting, he made clear the strengths and weaknesses of each. As ways of coding the assignment of kin types to kin terms they were, in fact, alternative ways of going at the same task. 8 But, by foregrounding contrasting parts of the problem, they laid the groundwork for the next analytic insights. That is, componential analysis foregrounded semantic sense or meaning relations among contrasting terminological categories (i.e. what was at issue in X vs. Y), while rewrite (or extension/reduction) analysis (see also foregrounded relations among the various referents of each separate term (i.e. how do you know which items (here, kin types) go into X).
Subsequent work (see Kronenfeld, 1976 Kronenfeld, : 914-15, 1980a Lehman, 1993, this issue; Read, 1984, this issue; Gould, 2000) separates the formal analysis question into two separate (though not totally independent) issues: (a) what accounts for the particular set of terminological distinctions among the categories in question, and (b) what accounts for the assignment of kin types to the categories in question. Additional linguistic issues can, of course, also exist -such as what derivational or metaphoric associations exist for the kin terms in question and how do these color kin term usage (see Kronenfeld, 1991) .
There has been in kin terminological studies continuing debate concerning what form of formal analysis is best. Claims have usually been framed in terms of one or another assertedly primary criterion -see, for example, Scheffler's (1972a Scheffler's ( , 1972b Scheffler's ( , 1982 structural criterion, Keen's (1985) natural language operations criterion, or Romney and D'Andrade's (1964) 'psychological reality' one. More recently, some have come to realize that one or another interpretation of structural or psychological reality only represents one among a larger variety of alternative analytic goals to which an analysis might be addressed. Alternative kinds of formal analyses, if formally equivalent (or, at least, approximately so) in their assignment of kin types to kin terms, can all be valid (see Kronenfeld, 1980b) . Different kinds of formal analysis seem to lend themselves better to different kinds of analytic questions (e.g. mathematical structure, history of development, sociological bases, cognitive operations for use, folk definitions for category decisions, folk reasoning re social applications, etc.). The particular form of analysis used is less important than is its substantive assertions about the domain being analyzed. Also important is the actual aim of the analysis. Within any type of analysis, and given comparable analytic effectiveness, Occam's razor cuts: fewer, simpler, and more general operations (that is, axiomatic assumptions) are preferable to the opposite.
Terminological patterns or types have traditionally been classed in a variety of ways. Types have been based on the classification of first generation lineals and co-lineals, and on the zero generation classification of siblings and (first) cousins; classification has been based on diagnostic kin term equations, on presumed marriage or alliance patterns, and on applicable equivalence rule sets. Sometimes the same name, e.g. 'Dravidian-type', can refer to different systems, depending on the typology being used. Different forms of classification relate to different analytic approaches. I do not want to pursue the classification question here, but only to point out that different theories and forms of analysis can entail differing classifications, and thus that analytic approaches and classifications form an integrated package. The explanations we seek concern not how well some analysis accounts for an a priori classification, but how much of interest the combination of analysis and linked classification tells us.
WHAT SHAPES KIN TERMINOLOGIES
Our basic question, then, is: What are (or might be) our various terminological patterns or types? Related questions include: What combination of social, cognitive and historical conditions produce one or another terminological type, and what -possibly differentconditions maintain that type (see Kronenfeld, 1989: 95-8, in press; Trautmann and Barnes, 1999) ? What explains the details not accounted for by the type definition and how do such details interact with the type characteristics?
By 'social conditions' I refer to the reasons why, in the society or language in question, the given categories of kin are useful 9 ones to carve out -whether terms or distinctions. 10 Such reasons can include conversational use of the categories that seems frequently encouraged by cultural rules (concerning, perhaps, marriage [cf. Houseman and White, 1998 ], the devolution of property, access to resources, or some such). Reasons of this sort might be thought of as 'intrinsic' in the sense that they pertain directly to structural elements in the given society.
I have not listed economic and ecological factors as any separate kind of reason for terminological systems, even though they obviously loom as important shapers of kin terminologies. My reason is that there exists no direct mechanism for such factors to have an effect on a kin terminology. Kinship terms are, among other things, words in a language, and are gained, lost, or changed in the same manner as are other words. New words (Saussurean signs) get into a language when people speak frequently enough of the concepts in question so that previously periphrastic expressions are reduced to new words (signifiers) with the meanings (signifieds) in question, or when foreign words with the relevant meanings are borrowed (and displace relevant categories in the previously existing semantic system), or when older words acquire new signification. The preceding means that economic or ecological factors can only affect the kin terminology ifand insofar as -they affect conversations, and thus that any effect they have is socially mediated. Additionally, such factors are socially mediated in the different sense that they only have their effects through social interactions and usually only via social groups. 11 Social reasons for kin terminological features can also include issues regarding the relationship of one's own society to other neighboring ones. There is some ethnographic evidence, I gather (see Meggitt, 1962: 168; Scheffler, 1978: 455) , that some Australian societies, for example, adopted from neighboring groups more complex section systems than they themselves had previously had (possibly for reasons relating to intellectual ANTHROPOLOGICAL THEORY 1(2) stimulation!). Emulation can also stem from an attempt to adopt a system that shows one's culture as relatively more 'civilized' or 'advanced'. Such attempts to gain status by emulating high status models are, I gather, a common feature of 'Sanskritization' in areas influenced by Indian culture. Reasons relating to social emulation might be thought of as more 'extrinsic' to the cultures in question than reasons of the sort that I have called intrinsic.
Cognitive conditions or reasons for terminological features have to do with our tendency to shape the categories of our language and of our thought into forms that are relatively easy (for humans, with normal human cognitive capacities) to comprehend and calculate (for example, see Kronenfeld, 1989: 96) . Examples of cognitive shapers include the relative ease with which we handle conjunctively defined categories as opposed to disjunctively defined ones (Nerlove and Romney, 1967; Kronenfeld, 1974) , the severe limits that exist on our ability to make absolute judgments and calculations (vs. relative ones) and the ways in which we get around these limits (e.g. the use of approximations, embedding of information in hierarchically recoded 'chunks,' etc. [Miller, 1956; Kronenfeld, 1996: Ch. 8] , as well as the use we make of 'marking' defaults [Greenberg, 1949 [Greenberg, , 1966 Hage, 1999; Randall, 1977 Randall, , 1985 Kronenfeld, 1996: Ch. 7] ).
Historical reasons for terminological patterns include a kind of continuity constraint. Any changes a culture makes in its terminological systems -whether for social reasons, cognitive reasons, or some other reasons -are not made (and cannot be made) in a vacuum, isolated from other aspects of thought in the culture; such changes can not represent de novo creations. Changes are made in an historically given context and from historically given bases, and thus -in one way or another -changes are always likely to represent variations on some pre-existing theme (cf. Allen, 1998; Hage, 1998a Hage, , 1998b . That is, relevant new social factors will not be expressed in the terminology directly by absolute creations, but instead will produce their effects on the terminology via changes in the pre-existing pattern. A separate historical factor can be seen in the choice of which external models (if any) members of a culture choose for emulation.
A very different kind of historical consideration enters in when a culture/society loses some social forms that had previously represented 'intrinsic' reasons for some terminological factor. The culture in such a situation of change might, conservatively, try to maintain its existing terminology, but might find the relevant calculations or classifications difficult or cumbersome in the new absence of the relevant social forms. 12 In such a situation the effect on the terminology of the loss of a previously intrinsic social form might not be the disappearance of the terminological feature relevant to that social form, but might, instead, be a recasting of the terminological feature -in the absence of the relevant social form -into a new, easier to calculate form. This scenario was offered in my Morgan/Dorsey article (Kronenfeld, 1989: 96-7) as one possible explanation for the adoption of an Iroquois-type terminological system by a society that previously might, with different social conditions, have had a Dravidian-type one. 13 This explanation is similar to the version of the received wisdom that has avunculocality arising when social conditions obtain in an already matrilineal society that would, in a non-unilineal society, have produced patrilocality.
FORMAL RULE SYSTEMS AND TERMINOLOGICAL COMPARISON
When comparing one terminological system to another (or one version of one with another version, or an actual terminological system with some abstract model -e.g. a 'type' definition), one gains the most power and insight by comparing the 'rule' systems (that is, the formal system of categorical distinctions and rules for extension) that generate the terminological systems in question, rather than by comparing either the sum total of specific kin-type-to-kin-term assignments or some specified set of 'diagnostic equations' (i.e. of kin type pairs labeled by the same kin term). This claim is based both on grounds of parsimony and cognitive reasonableness. Parsimony is seen in the rules' representation of the minimal set of information that is sufficient to produce the terminological assignments in question. Cognitive reasonableness is seen in our observation that native speakers do not memorize a list of genealogical positions and their terminological assignments, but learn some operations for deducing some assignments from others; our rules represent those operations. The specific form taken by the rules in some given analysis may well differ from the specific form of native speaker operations, 14 but the rules (if parsimonious) must be logically equivalent (or translatable) to those operations (to the degree that they correctly reproduce the correct terminological assignments). Alternative rule systems may equally well account for native speaker terminological assignments, and such alternatives may be equally valid for this primary purpose; an anthropologist's preference for one or the other in some specific analytic situation may well depend on which deals more effectively with some further data, criteria, or aspects of the problem being attacked (see, for example, the general argument of Kronenfeld, 1980b ; see also the example on p. 90 in Kronenfeld, 1989) .
The various factors that shape some given terminological system do not always act in concert. They do not always map clearly onto elegant mathematical representations. These conditions make the problem of explanation more interesting and complex than it would otherwise be. By way of illustration I want to explore the relationship between cognitive and social considerations on the one side and formal, mathematical considerations on the other. 15 In this discussion I presume that kinship terminologies must be cognitively processable, and thus that they are constrained and shaped by cognitive considerations. But I am not assuming that we always understand such influences and constraints well enough to build them into our construction or evaluation of formal models. Nor am I ruling out the possibility that there may exist reasons for exploring formulations that run directly against such cognitive considerations or mathematical formulations. I examine some research and findings to seek additional cognitive or social considerations that pose questions about a given analysis. I then explore how such examples might point to constraints on the range of formally possible solutions, how (conversely) the examples might suggest a need for re-evaluating our current understandings of cognitive processes and the constraints they represent, or how the examples might speak not so much to the formal analysis itself, but to the way in which people might actually instantiate the described regularities in their learning and use of the terms in question. Thus, I am in no sense opposing cognitive (or social) considerations to formal ones, but am trying to see how the interaction of the two can lead us to a richer, fuller, and -dare I say it -more accurate understanding of kinship terminologies.
Formal analysis is crucial to any concern with social or cognitive explanations for kin terminologies. Formal analysis shifts such questions from a focus on particular terms, ANTHROPOLOGICAL THEORY 1(2) types, or equivalences to a focus on axioms or rules. When one has accounted for these, one has logically accounted for the terminology. But formal analysis is not equivalent to a consideration of social and cognitive questions, and it does not simply pre-empt them. We still are left with interesting and substantial questions such as:
1 Which, out of alternative sets of formal axioms, best fit with other considerationssocial or cognitive, but also, possibly, historical, economic, and so forth? 2 Why does the system have these axioms vs. some others -what ends do they serve, and what alternatives were possible given the previous state from which the system was changing? 3 How do native users learn, code, and use the regularities captured by the formal analysis? How do they, in their minds, recognize the regularities, organize their codings of them, and respond to them?
This is not, I should note, an issue of conscious understanding -however interesting and significant such questions can sometimes be. That is, this is not a Marvin Harris 'emic' issue. Instead, the issue concerns the kind of learned, but automatic, mental processing that goes into our normal execution of grammar -in the context of whatever innate dispositions and situational regularities might be available to guide our learning. It is (a) exemplified in the kind of regularity in the English plural suffix for nouns that makes it an 's' or a 'z' or an 'ez' depending on phonological context -posited by linguists and demonstrated by psychologists such as Brown and Berko with made-up entities such as 'wugs'. It is (b) the issue of the unconscious patterning or structuring of phonemic systems which Sapir showed the psychological force of and which Trubetzkoy formally analyzed. It is (c) the understanding that enables you quickly to tell me that this thing I'm using to make notes is not a pencil and not a quill.
Before moving on to my examples, I would like first to underline a few important issues:
1 What is the 'it' that kin terminologies respond to? I have seen ways in which they reflect functional or substantive regularities involving nurturance and succession in the cultures of their speakers 16 -and, thus, are constrained by the shape of those regularities. However, as several have noted, they respond also to the kind of cognitive constraints entailed by conjunctivity, marking, and the like (see Kronenfeld, 1996 : Section III, Explanatory Principles). Sometimes these different kinds of constraints work at cross-purposes -producing results that are systemically odd 17 -as, for example, in the Fanti terminology, where (a) there is an 'uncle' term (for mother's brother and extensions), but no 'aunt' term (in contrast to the culturally almost identical Ashanti who do have such an 'aunt' term), 18 and (b) there exists a salient and important male's 'sister' term that falls totally within the range of the equally salient and important 'sibling' term. 2 Both native speaker definitions and efficient formalizations sometimes fail (either for reasons relating to the preceding issue of cross-cutting constraints or for reasons relating to tensions between kernel paradigms and extension regularities) to embody regularities (e.g. conjunctivities) that native speakers clearly are responding to. For instance, the Fanti do not terminologically distinguish a 'parent' term (combining KRONENFELD Introduction 'mother' and 'father'), even though for many terminological as well as cultural purposes they appear to act in terms of such a parent category. 3 Implicit -that is, unrecognized by native speakers -regularities are massively present in our behavior 19 -see grammar itself for the oldest and most salient example. But, with grammar, it has become also useful and appropriate to explore the combination of learning situation and biological givens that reproduce these regularities in successive generations of new speakers. And, in turn, on occasion, the exploration of such learning has led to significant refinements of the relevant grammatical analysis -as, for example, when linguists' models of Russian verb conjugations were revised in the light of studies of how children learned them.
SOME COMPARATIVE EXAMPLES 1
When I (Kronenfeld, 1980b ) compared a Romney version of a Lounsburian-type analysis of the Fanti terminology with a formalization of the ways in which Fanti speakers made terminological assignments, I found that neither kind of analysis eliminated the usefulness of the other. The two analyses each accomplished different ends. I am not claiming that Lounsbury has given us the final word on formal analysis nor that his formulations are terribly elegant, but his approach does capture certain kinds of regularities in the data that we would expect any efficient formal analysis to capture. What was interesting in this case was that the Fanti themselves did not explicitly recognize these regularities in their use of their system -even though the regularities were clearly present. The major regularity at issue is conjunctivity. A case of conjunctivity does exist, for instance, in G+1 which is not recognized in Fanti codings -which represent 'mother's [same sex] sibling = mother' and 'father's [same sex] sibling = father', but which contain no locution to the effect that 'parent's [same sex] sibling = parent'; this kind of omission represents a major weakness of natural language approaches to kin term analysis vs. more abstract ones. The conjunctivity problem poses at least two research questions: (1) How do the Fanti maintain the conjunctivity without coding or overtly recognizing it? My brief guess would be a systemic answerrelating to what shows up in all algebraic treatments of such things -i.e. superclasses and so on. 20 (2) Why do the Fanti not overtly recognize the conjunctivity -that is, not appear to use any 'parent' cover term at all? My guess is ideology -their matrilineal emphasis on the existence of sharp differences between parents regarding ego's kin affiliations and regarding the nature of resources shared with ego.
Thus, the formal analysis that best represents the regularities of the terminology may not necessarily be best at representing the cognitive operations by which native speakers navigate the system. Cultural factors may lead them not to recognize regularities that they are responding to. Conversely, regularities of experience or of the world (perhaps, say, of the nature of genealogical space) may produce regularities in their behavior that they are not even subliminally aware of. In a similar vein, kinship work of the mathematician Sydney H. Gould, which I recently edited for publication (Gould, 2000) , raises the possibility that an analysis that best represents the logical structure of, say, the Fanti kin term system might not be best either at capturing all the regularities in the terminology or at directly representing native operations.
My points here are two. First, any evaluation of a form of analysis depends on the ANTHROPOLOGICAL THEORY 1 (2) goals at which the analysis is aimed; and -where we take the machinery of the analysis seriously, and not just its output -different analytic aims may entail different forms of analysis. In an overdetermined universe such as kinship, the existence of a range of alternative analytic mechanisms for getting to the same end place should not be surprising. Second, and more pertinent to my present topic, even analyses aimed at noncognitive purposes have to be cognitively plausible -that is, reasonable as potential products of human cognition. There can, however, exist alternative ways of attacking the plausibility issue: one can ground an analysis in native operations (as in Keen, 1985 ; also cf. Wierzbicka, 1992 and others); or one can offer evidence for the subconscious nature of the posited regularities -perhaps even with reasons for why they might be kept subconscious; or one can show that the regularities are simply and obviously present in external phenomena that the terms represent, such that any representation of those phenomena will necessarily include the regularity in question. It can also be the case, as I will illustrate in my next example, that a strong either empirical or formal finding can force us to re-evaluate -and modify -our conceptualization of the relevant cognitive operations or constraints.
2
Romney and D'Andrade's treatment of the componential analysis of English kin terms (1964) considerably advanced -and complicated -our understanding of the cognitive side of kinship terminologies. The advance came from the novel (in anthropology at least), if Baconian, suggestion that one address the question of psychological reality through direct measurement rather than simply as an exercise in scholarly reasoning. They developed an experimental design and a psychological task which allowed them to model the structure held by native speakers and then compare that structure with the structure embodied in alternative componential models. Romney and D'Andrade's analysis differed from Wallace and Atkins's (1960) earlier one in a few significant ways. In place of Wallace and Atkins's lineal/co-lineal/ablineal distinction (briefly: direct ancestors and, reciprocally, descendents/siblings of ascendent lineals [including self ] and, reciprocally, descendents of siblings/more distant consanguines), they offered a direct/collateral one; their direct category was made up of lineals plus siblings and their collateral category was made up of ablineals plus the remaining co-lineals. In place of Wallace and Atkins's signed generation (+2/+1/0/-1/-2), they offered a combination of absolute generation (0/1/2) and polarity (+/-).
The complications came from what in particular they found. They found solid empirical support for a cognitive structure that had two severe drawbacks: first, along with other componential structures, it could not function as a model of native speaker recognition of kin term category referents. And second, one of the major dimensions in the structure, direct/collateral, was composed of disjunctively defined categories.
The first problem derived from the fact that you had to know someone's relationship to you before you could figure out that person's values on the distinctive features; distinctive features in kinship semantic analyses could not be the kind of distinctive perceptual features that they were in phonological componential analysis. Since there existed strong empirical support for the psychological reality of the structure, the inference had to be (a) that the structure was used for something other than recognition of referents, and (b) that there existed some other cognitive device or structure that was KRONENFELD Introduction used for recognition. Thus Romney and D'Andrade's analysis forced the issue of alternative analyses -and, more narrowly, of alternative cognitive structures. The cognitive structures used for reasoning about concepts might be different from those used to recognize instances of the concepts.
The second problem posed by Romney and D'Andrade's findings concerned the importance of conjunctivity in the definition of concepts. Romney, this time with Nerlove (Nerlove and Romney, 1967 ; and see Kronenfeld, 1974) , demonstrated the importance for language, and more particularly for kin terms, of conjunctivity 21 in a study that derived from findings of Bruner, Goodnow, and Austin (1956) in psychology. This study, thus, went beyond the 'Occam's razor' appeal to conjunctivity that mathematicians and scientists have always made, and that Lounsbury made in his componential analysis work (1964a) -by demonstrating the overwhelming psychological importance of conjunctivity, and by confirming the difference (regarding negated categories) 22 that Bruner, Goodnow, and Austin had found between the psychologically operative form of conjunctivity and the logical form.
Even if, with the benefit of hindsight, one interprets both Romney studies as pertaining to kernel referents rather than to extended ranges -and thus eliminates some problems with the Romney and D'Andrade study concerning overlapping categories and disjunctive definitions of extended ranges -one still is left with the unavoidable disjunctivity in the definition of the key direct/collateral feature.
Romney, with D'Andrade and others, has adduced enough evidence for one to be forced to admit the disjunctivity as real and present. The question is what follows then? Do we throw out conjunctivity as a standard, in spite of the Nerlove and Romney findings? Or, do we just write English off as an exception? I propose that, instead of such external approaches, we look carefully at the specific disjunctivity in order to see how natives might cope with the disjunctivity issue, and why the feature, even with its disjunctivity, might be attractive to them. The attractiveness question represents a consideration of why such a category is useful and thus of what social information it might suggest. If disjunctivity entails additional cognitive work, then attractiveness represents what it is that makes the work worthwhile in the particular situation.
For the sake of argument, and without proof, let me suggest that the disjunctivity in the direct and collateral features, while real, is indeed minimal -and that in normal usage natives manage not to confront it. I suggest that the feature is conceived of as the ancestors and descendants of ego's nuclear family -and that, as such, it seems conjunctive. Its disjunctivity only becomes clear when we realize that the nuclear family we share our ancestors with -our nuclear family of orientation -is quite different in make-up from the one we share our descendants with -our nuclear family of procreation. In everyday life we rarely have occasion to confront the contrast: we only live in one at a time; we think of our ancestors through only one and our descendants through the other; and, at the age of most of Romney and D'Andrade's informants (college undergraduates), most of us hadn't yet acquired the second one, anyway. What it tells us about American society, I think, is that the lineal concerns of inheritance and property which get instantiated in the lineal feature that anthropologists from Morgan (1871) through Wallace and Atkins (1960) have found important to English kinship are much less important to contemporary Americans than are the concerns with shared nurturance and support represented by the nuclear family -possibly especially to college sophomores not yet even worrying about inheriting anything, let alone bequeathing it.
In terms of our concern with cognitive constraints or influences on formal analysis, I suggest that, in this example, the cognitive constraint -conjunctivity -is important, but not mindlessly and automatically determinative. Native speakers, in shaping a terminology, are not conducting an exercise in abstract logic, but are fashioning a tool that will aid them in talking about things that are important to them. They are looking, then, in effect, for some best mix between the functional efficiency with which the tool/concept fits what they want to talk about and the cognitive efficiency with which the tool/concept is defined. This kind of functional fiddling with logical purity seems as likely to happen with more elegant algebraic formulations as it is with older and simpler componential models.
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I would now like to turn to Dwight Read's KAES program (Read, 1974, this issue; Read and Behrens, 1990) , and its algebraic analysis of English kin terms. In particular I want to consider the inclusion in English of uncles and aunts by marriage (a+aof=m and a+aom=f ) in our 'uncle' and 'aunt' categories. 23 Read shows elegantly how the terminological inclusion of uncles' and aunts' spouses in our 'aunt' and 'uncle' kin term categories falls naturally out from basic axioms of the English system. This fact is formally an epiphenomenal by-product of something elsethe equivalence between brothers-in-law and that between sisters-in-law represented by our self-reciprocal brother-in-law and sister-in-law terms. When some piece of a system is totally derived from some more general propositions, we normally consider the piece accounted for, and consider any further special explanation at best superfluous -and so there perhaps should be nothing left to say about aunts and uncles by marriage.
However, I do want to suggest that there do remain some interesting cognitive questions here -not about the system itself but about our native-speaker application of it. To begin with, I suggest that the grouping does feel strange to us as native speakerssince it is the only place where we ignore the consanguine/affine distinction; the equivalence of brother's-in-law that it derives from deals purely with affines. Then, also, there exist hedges by which we undercut the equation: 'he's not really my uncle, he's just my aunt's husband' or 'my uncle-by-marriage').
Analytic questions that come to mind are (1) how (by what sequence of perceptions and operations) do native speakers learn the system, such that they respond to the derivational regularity, and (2) why, if it does indeed feel strange, do they not override the derivation with some ad hoc limitation (such as does sometime occur in kin terminologies -and like what we saw with the override of conjunctivity in the Romney and D'Andrade structure)? I suspect that these relatives' presence on the scene prior to ego's arrival in close consanguineally related families and the symmetries in terminological use between one or the other of their parents and the 'parents' in that other family (the inlaw basis of Read's derivation -that is, ego's parents refer to both their spouses' siblings [consanguine relatives of ego] and their spouses' sibling's spouses [affines] as 'in-laws') gives kids the consistency before they come to realize that some of those uncles and aunts are their consanguines, while others are not. I think this pattern is not systematically repeated for any other kin term categories in English. This temporal and computational KRONENFELD Introduction ordering implies that the fact of the equation is already well established in our minds and usage before we learn enough to understand why it is odd.
I suggest that this example shows how, even with an elegant, tight, and successful formal algebraic analysis, there still exist significant cognitive questions about the instantiation of the formal system in native speakers' minds and about where the possibility of not fully implementing the underlying system is raised in native minds, and then either acted on or not.
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Tjon Sie Fat (TSF), in a paper prepared for the 1993 Maison Suger workshop on Dravidian, Iroquois and Crow-Omaha systems, 24 considers the 'Dravidian', 'Iroquois' and related type kin term systems as algebraic structures, rather than as systems of kin classification. His particular 'objective is to specify suitable multiplication tables for the composition of Dravidian and Iroquois cross/parallel relations' (see Tjon Sie Fat, 1998: 64) -by which various multiplicative combinations of cross and parallel primary entities (in a string) produce cross or parallel products. If one takes a string of entities and successively applies a binary operation to reducing the string, differing alternative bracketings may produce different results; if the operation is associative, then such bracketing differences will have no effect. 25 The entities under consideration are cross or parallel relatives, marked for relative generation and relative sex. TSF is looking at the three central generations of systems, and looking for a consistent way of treating all three together, producing a 12 by 12 multiplication Fat, 1998: 63-4) . Assuming alternative sets of values for different systems representing different versions of the multiplication table, one can examine strings longer than two for associativity in each of these alternatives. TSF first shows 'that the "Dravidian" structure is "nearly" associative' while the 'Iroquois' structure is non-associative', and extends that comparison to show that 'simply varying the constraints on associativity in the basic "Iroquois" model . . . generate[s] a variety of "generational" types ' (1998: 2-3) .
We now have enough of TSF's analysis for my present purposes, and, since I am not doing the algebra, I would like to leave TSF's particular analysis and conclusions aside -beyond saying that I found his paper quite suggestive and stimulating.
The biggest question that I had when I read the paper, I will confess, was not an algebraic one, but a cognitive one -or, rather, a couple of cognitive ones: (1) how were native speakers supposed to learn and then keep in mind any form or equivalent of such a 12 by 12 multiplication table (where there was no sure way to (re)generate entries one forgot, and where the tables were not taught, but extracted out from usage); and (2) given the demonstrations we have of the psychological importance of conjunctivity, how was one to deal with the massive disjunctivity represented by such a table?
My interest was piqued when, in response to a suggestion of Godelier, TSF reviewed some of my papers from the perspective of his paper, and noted that my handling of the relationship between alternative patterns of extension in my formalization of the Fanti system of folk definitions (Kronenfeld, 1980b) involved alternative bracketings of the sort he discussed in his paper -though among kin term categories (of the sort that he used in his illustrative examples) 26 instead of among the 'cross' and 'parallel' categories on which his paper focuses.
ANTHROPOLOGICAL THEORY 1(2)
Our concern, here, is with the usefulness of alternative mappings (as produced by TSF's relaxation of associativity constraints), and not with associativity per se. But we should note that it is the relaxation of the associativity requirement that produces the mapping alternatives. Thus, allowing the alternatives amounts, at the same time, to removing much of the systematicity that allows native users to recompute (or reason) relations from a small set of assumptions (as opposed to the more cognitively demanding requirement that they memorize complex tables of ad hoc relations). It follows that any relaxation of the associativity requirement will have, empirically, to be linked either with some other device for easing the cognitive task or with some kind of heavy-duty teaching program. The teaching alternative seems unlikely, in general, and so my expectation would be that the associativity constraint would only be selectively lifted, and only then either in situations in which the non-associativity was minimal and focused in some salient place in the terminology or in situations in which there existed some other basis (i.e. cognitive crutch) for reasoning or reconstructing the relations in question.
The Fanti contained the bracketing problem in two ways. First they limited all of their relative product multiplications -almost without exception, where the one major exception is interesting -to ones where only primary or direct categories appeared on the left side (i.e. as X or Y in X*Y = Z -where '=' means equivalent). Thus in their reduction of longer strings they exhausted the multiplications that produced such a primary on the right side (as Z) before turning to ones that produced secondary or indirect products. Second, they restricted their use of a difference between alternative bracketings to the one single place that was crucial to the selection of one or the other extension pattern; elsewhere they maintained the associativity of the bracketings that they used.
My conclusion here is that, in spite of my initial reservations, TSF's basic analytic claims will not live or die on the basis of cognitive considerations. Instead (1) I would expect cognitive ease considerations to enter heavily into the ways in which any nonassociative variant (out of the family of possibilities he raises) is found actually to be implemented in any functioning system; (2) while functional/social (or maybe, even, aesthetic) considerations can certainly lead to cognitively difficult entities or operations, there still will exist devices or presuppositions that serve to reduce drastically the difficulty from what it would otherwise be; and (3) the cognitive challenge to some given formal analysis sometimes can militate against the formalism in question, but at other times it can result in new cognitive insights.
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The major Fanti exception to the limitation of the left side of a multiplication to two primary or direct terms is interesting with regard to our general cognitive ease issue. The idea of a system of terms (vs. a distinct list of referents for each term in a list) is to reduce cognitive load -hence the idea that a full set of mappings (such as that laid out by TSF) needs to be learned by natives is unconvincing. But a possibly cognitively plausible variant, suggested above, is that systematic redundancies might be presumed by native speakers -as a kind of default -leaving only specific marked/flagged exceptions to be specifically separately learned.
As an example of such defaults with exceptions, consider the Fanti use of 'Nana n'ba = ba' grandrelative's child = own child (on the model of 'wofa n'ba = ba' [a+fom-a = aom-a], the entry point into the skewed system), but only for a+f+f(+f )om-a where focal KRONENFELD Introduction 'nana' is a+a+a, and it is understood that all the other types of 'nana n'ba' are taken care of via chains of primary term equations (see Kronenfeld, 1980b) . This understanding removes ambiguity, by leaving this string as the only grandrelative whose child gets a special terminological assignment. Thus the system can stick to a relatively compact pattern of 2-to-1 mappings premised on the restriction of left-side terms to primary terms (vs. a much greater array of 3-to-1 mappings that would be required by any systematic left-side use of more distant terms). 27 In conclusion, I would like to urge that -as we get increasingly effective and sophisticated formal analyses of various kinds of kinship systems -we begin utilizing these improved formal understandings of the regularities in kinship systems (whether kin terms, kin groups, or marriage systems) to address the empirical questions that drove the early kinship interests of our anthropological forebears -such as Morgan, Rivers, and Kroeber: what do these systems tell us about the social and conceptual lives of their users?
Sometimes an underlying robustness can be masked by specialized phrasings and notational forms -which is unfortunate insofar as that masking dampens any wider discussion or consideration. 4 A 'model' is a simplified representation that mirrors (or 'models') something (sometimes, entities and processes) that is sometimes useful for experimenting on and sometimes useful for illustrative communication, but that lacks the axiomatic structure and logical closure of a theory. Models can be anything from formally explicit to loosely metaphoric; formally explicit ones (such as, for example, some computer simulations, e.g. Kronenfeld, 1976) can be useful in somewhat the same way good intensive descriptions can be. 5 That is, is formally equivalent to the explanatory theory -translatable into it -or nearly so. 6 Morgan's role in the analysis and explanation (vs. collection and classification) of kin terminologies was for a long time discredited -partially because of his evolutionist perspective itself and partially because of the specific social stages he invoked.
Masked by the discrediting of his specifics were what now, in the light of Lounsbury's work (1964b), seem genuinely useful insights into kinds of social factors (parenting and inheritance/succession) that shape terminologies. 7 Remember, Kroeber's labeling of his linguistic side of the debate as 'psychological' came before the publication of the works of Saussure, Trubetzkoy, and Bloomfield, via which structural linguistics came to be radically distanced from psychology. 8 The formalization was crucial. Even though Lounsbury and Goodenough lacked formal theories of kinship terminologies (or, more narrowly, of genealogical space) in the sense outlined earlier in this essay, it was the explicitness of their formal accounts that enabled the explorations of patterns and relationships that led to subsequent theories. It was only when explicit accounts were attempted that the precise shape of terminological features could be seen. Similarly, it was the empirical richness of the wider semantic, social, and cognitive implications of Lounsbury's formal account that led to renewed interest in, and new insights into, the explanation of kin terminologies. It was only then that the interrelations among different features and other properties of terminological systems could be systematically evaluated, that the limitations of various alternative approaches could be seen, and that the possible relationship of terminological features to other -linguistic, social or cognitive -aspects of kinship or kinfolk, or of language and/or culture more generally, be explicitly evaluated. 9 'Useful' is to be distinguished from logically necessary. Sometimes, terminological characteristics can serve useful functions without being logically necessitated by such functions -and, sometimes, the terminological characteristics can exist without any necessary presence of the given functions. Such usefulness can, nonetheless, represent a reason for speakers moving toward one terminological variant vs. another. In other situations some social feature may indeed be claimed as logically necessary for some terminological characteristic. 10 Remember that the terms are always parts of a system, and 'carved' within the context of the given system. 11 Economic and ecological factors, inter alia, do directly affect the presence and shape of kinship groups and social rules. But in the present discussion we are only concerned with terminological systems. These factors seem only to affect terminological systems via the kinds of mediation suggested. 12 F.K. Lehman (personal communication) has offered the example of Burmese, in which social changes have produced a situation in which there presently exist two terms (distinct terms for father's brother and mother's brother) for what may well now amount to a single social function. This situation is cumbersome and has resulted -in current usage in the Lower Burma dialect -in the use of the mother's brother term for both kinds of 'uncle'; so far, the more classical Upper Burma dialect still maintains the distinction. 13 As an example of the kind of shift that can take place, we can consider the equation of mother's brother's wife (MBW) with father's sister (FZ) in Dravidian-and Iroquois-type systems. In Dravidian the equivalence is a logically necessary (and, hence, important) one. In Iroquois the possible equivalence is an instance of what Murdock (1949: 136-7) calls 'immateriality' (and others call 'indifference'). This is a kind of residual or 'waste basket' similarity represented by the fact that, in a system of Agnatic descent, they are alike in both being not married to men in 'our' own kin group. This weak Iroquois-type similarity (even where it is terminologically instantiated) does not map onto an alliance system in the way that the stronger Dravidian-type equivalence does -a point sometimes missed in discussions of the two types of systems. 14 'The reason [that] native speakers do not memorise such lists is [that] genealogical space has infinitely many pairwise distinct points, [and] so finite memory cannot encompass them in direct storage. Then saying that the specific form of postulated rules need only be equivalent to those of the native speaker is really to say that our formalisms only are specifications of the relational properties of a cognitive domain; obviously they do not themselves correspond materially to the way such things work in wetware!' (F. Lehman, personal communication) . For relatedness see Witz (1974, 1979) and Lehman (1985) . 15 In attending to the social and communicative functions of kin terms, and in focusing on the shaping effects of cognitive ease considerations, I am attending to attributes that directly pertain to the social construction and social distribution of kin term systems. 16 As F. Lehman has offered in a personal communication: 'I also submit that there are universal as well as culturally particular functions involved about nurturance and succession, namely the universal (and both biologically and demographically indispensable) need to position at birth every infant born into a definite network of social relations without having to wait for the child to learn behavioural rules. No society could survive without this; too many infants would die off for lack of clear nurturant responsibilities if it could not, say, be a 'nephew' until it knew how to be one properly (so much for Murdock's adoption of Learning Theoretic theories of social relations!). Thus genealogically based systems are not accidental; in all of social structure, these alone are not defined behaviourally and the behavioural specifications only define propriety of behaviour rather than defining whether one is in the relationship or not! E.g. take being a 'student', or a 'king': if you have not registered and been accepted (this is behavioural definition) you are not a student; and if you've
